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INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, low-educated single mothers left cash welfare and increased their labor
force participation at unprecedented rates (Blank 2006). A number of factors contributed to these
dramatic changes: the 1996 welfare reform, the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), and the economic expansion of the late 1990s (Ellwood 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum
2001). An important question is the extent to which increased work effort by low-educated single
mothers who experience job loss has translated into increased access to unemployment insurance
(UI).
Spurred by recent research conducted at the Upjohn Institute that focuses on UI receipt
among former TANF recipients (O’Leary and Kline 2008), the current study addresses three
questions about the UI utilization of low-educated single mothers:
1) Has the large growth in labor force participation among adult single mothers since the
early 1990s been accompanied by a growth in UI participation by this population when they
experience a spell of unemployment?
2) Has eligibility for UI changed over time for this group, and are nonmonetary or
monetary eligibility requirements now more important?
3) Has the relative importance of three major income support programs—UI, the Food
Stamp Program, and cash welfare—changed for single mothers who enter a spell of
unemployment?
Background
Eligibility for benefits depends on two factors: monetary and nonmonetary eligibility.
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In order to be monetarily eligible, an individual typically must have a minimum level of
earnings from a qualified employer over four out of five recent quarters. The minimum earnings
threshold varies by state but is generally in the range of $1,000 to $3,000. Some states also
impose a high quarter requirement, which is a separate minimum earnings amount in one of the
quarters. Some recent studies find that TANF leavers and other groups of low-wage workers
already have high rates of monetary eligibility (O’Leary and Kline 2008; Shaefer 2010). High
levels of monetary eligibility among vulnerable populations suggest that this is not the primary
factor driving low levels of UI participation.
Nonmonetary eligibility has to do with an individual’s reason for job loss, and whether or
not the would-be recipient is looking for work. Though some states now allow workers who
voluntarily quit for good cause (such as to care for a sick family member, loss of child care, or to
escape domestic violence) to maintain eligibility, most states only provide unemployment
benefits to those who have experienced involuntary job loss. A number of existing studies
suggest that nonmonetary requirements may be the more important barrier to UI eligibility facing
vulnerable workers (Holzer 2000; O’Leary and Kline 2008; Rangarajan et al. 2002). Indeed, it
appears that low-wage workers are disproportionately employed in industries that tend to avoid
formal layoffs (GAO 2000; Lambert 2008).
A final factor affecting access to UI is benefits take-up. Wandner and Stettner (2000)
report that more than half of the unemployed do not file for UI, and that the most common
reason cited is “perceived ineligibility.” Furthermore, low-wage unemployed workers who are
eligible for UI may be less likely to take up UI benefits as compared to more advantaged eligible
unemployed workers (Shaefer 2010).
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CURRENT STUDY
To address the question of how the public program participation of recently unemployed
low-educated single mothers has changed over time, we compare them to similarly educated
single childless women. We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), a nationally representative, longitudinal data set collected by the U.S. Census Bureau
that, among other things, asks questions about labor market participation and public benefit
receipt. We focus on a subset of working-age 1 single women who have, at most, a high school
degree.

Among such women, we look specifically at those who have entered a spell of

unemployment. 2 Our study period is 1990 to 2005, with the early years, 1990 to 1994, defined
as prereform, and the later years, 2001 to 2005, defined as postreform. Both the pre- and
postreform periods included mild recessions, while the in-between period saw a major economic
boom. The middle period was also when most states implemented welfare reform.
We focus on relative outcomes between single mothers and single childless women
because these two subpopulations likely experience similar labor market dynamics. In this way
we hope to control for external factors leading to changes in program eligibility and
participation, and thus feel more confident that any observed outcomes are due to policy reforms.
For the purpose of this study, a woman is considered to have participated in UI if she
reported receiving cash benefits from her state’s program during the first three months following
a job separation. To estimate monetary eligibility for the program, each worker’s wages in a
simulated base period were compared to her state’s minimum earning requirements. To estimate
nonmonetary eligibility, a woman is considered to have met these requirements if her
1

We define working age as 22–55.
Entering a spell of unemployment is defined as having been employed and having worked the previous
month, and not working but seeking work in the current month, based on a woman’s self-report.
2
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unemployment spell began because she experienced an involuntary job loss. Women who
reported being fired or voluntarily quitting were considered ineligible. When we compare the
importance of UI participation to that of participation in other income support programs, we rely
on women’s self-reported receipt of either cash welfare or food stamps during the same period.

FINDINGS
As we would expect, between the pre- and postreform periods, the proportion of single
mothers who work rose considerably. During the same period, the proportion of single childless
women employed actually fell somewhat. We estimate that, as a result, the employment rate for
single mothers increased by 18 percentage points relative to that of the comparison group. But
did this dramatic increase in work effort among low-educated single mothers translate into
improved access to UI benefits during times of unemployment? To our knowledge, ours is the
first study to look across an extended period, on a national level, at changes in UI eligibility and
benefit receipt among women likely to have been affected by welfare reform.
UI Benefits: Eligibility and Receipt
Looking first at nonmonetary UI eligibility, we see in Table 1 that for both groups of
women, rates of nonmonetary eligibility are rather low. Roughly 40 percent of low-educated
single mothers experiencing a spell of unemployment were nonmonetarily eligible for UI during
both the pre- and postreform periods.

The rate of nonmonetary eligibility among similar

childless women actually fell—from about 46 percent to 36 percent across the two periods. This
led to an 8-percentage-point relative improvement in the nonmonetary eligibility of single
mothers as compared to single childless women.
4

As Table 1 shows, the low-educated single women in our study are more likely to meet
monetary UI requirements than nonmonetary requirements.

In both the prereform and

postreform periods, childless women were more likely than single mothers to be monetarily
eligible for UI, but the gap declined over time. During the prereform period, 71.5 percent of
single mothers and 84 percent of single childless women were monetarily eligible for UI upon
entering a spell of unemployment. During the postreform period, the figures are 77 percent and
83 percent, respectively. Thus, the relative rate of monetary eligibility for single mothers
compared to single childless women increased by 7 percentage points.
Interestingly—and perhaps surprisingly since the eligibility rates of single mothers
improved relative to those of single childless women—when we look at rates of UI benefit
receipt, we find that single mothers did not improve their probability of accessing UI benefits,
relative to single childless women, between the pre- and postreform periods. It is hard to know
exactly why this is the case. The most commonly cited reason for failing to file for
unemployment benefits is presumed ineligibility (Vroman 2009; Wandner and Stettner 2000).
Also, low-wage workers who meet eligibility criteria may be less likely to take advantage of
unemployment benefits than eligible higher-paid workers because they are more likely to
presume they are ineligible (Shaefer 2010).
In an effort to ascertain whether the above findings were not explained by unobserved
differences or changes in the makeup of the two groups of women (for instance, varying
educational levels or ethnic backgrounds), we also conducted multivariate analyses that allowed
us to control for a number of factors, including age, race, education, state, and the unemployment
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rate. We find that the results hold, with the relative differences in UI receipt between the two
groups of women pre- and postreform nearly identical in magnitude. 3
Relative Importance of Unemployment Insurance, Cash Welfare, and the Food Stamp
Program / Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
As seen in Figure 1, during the postreform years, a greater proportion of low-educated
single mothers entering a spell of unemployment received UI benefits than received cash
welfare. 4 This is the first time in our study period that this proved true for an extended period of
time. In 2002, for example, we estimate that 16 percent of single mothers entering a spell of
unemployment participated in cash welfare, whereas a bit more than 20 percent received
unemployment benefits. Since 2002, the proportion accessing TANF has shrunk even further.
Far more common than either of these programs was receipt of food stamp benefits.
Participation in the Food Stamp Program grew in the early 1990s but declined significantly
during the welfare reform years. The participation rates of recently unemployed low-educated
mothers rose significantly, however, during the postreform period, from 51 percent in 2001 to 64
percent in 2005—the highest of any year in the study. Comparing single mothers to single
childless women, we find that upon entering a spell of unemployment, low-educated single
mothers are far more likely (by approximately 25 percentage points) to get some form of aid than
are similarly educated single childless women. This disparity stays about the same across the
study period, despite the precipitous decline in the probability of receiving cash assistance.
In sum, even though we do not observe an increase in UI benefit receipt, because of the
decline in cash assistance UI became the more common form of income support for low-

3

For regression results and discussion, see the full-length paper of the same title that this brief is based on.
By cash welfare we mean Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and its predecessor, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
4
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educated single mothers entering a spell of unemployment during the post–welfare reform
period. Moreover, the probability of accessing food stamps, already the most highly utilized
income support program among this population, increased during the postreform period. As a
result, the proportion of this population accessing benefits from at least one of these programs
remained virtually unchanged across the study period. This does not say anything about the
amount of assistance that was received, on average.

DISCUSSION
Recent policy efforts to boost UI participation rates of low-income workers have focused
on reforming UI program eligibility rules. Our results lead to the conclusion that reforming
eligibility requirements may not, in and of itself, significantly increase benefit receipt. While
low-educated single mothers have seen both their monetary and nonmonetary eligibility rates
improve relative to similarly educated childless women, they have not realized relative
improvements in benefit receipt. This may be due to a lack of knowledge about the program, a
lack of understanding of a complex bureaucratic process, a quick transition back to work, or a
lack of need for benefits as a result, at least in part, of greater access to the Food Stamp Program.
To the extent that eligibility criteria do act as a barrier to UI for this population, we, like
others before us, find that nonmonetary requirements are a greater barrier than are monetary
requirements. Some might argue that low rates of nonmonetary eligibility result from personal
characteristics of low-educated single mothers, who may lack the skills or discipline to maintain
employment. If this were true, the best way to increase UI receipt might be through increased
job training programs that focus on these skills. On the other hand, most working single mothers
7

who become unemployed do meet UI monetary eligibility requirements, suggesting a substantial
attachment to the labor force.
Another possibility is reforming nonmonetary UI requirements to allow individuals who
quit a job (not those who were terminated for cause) and meet certain requirements to access
benefits. Though this raises serious issues of moral hazard (individuals may have an incentive to
quit if they know they can receive benefits), many other western industrial countries have more
liberal policies, limiting nonmonetary ineligibility to a few weeks or months rather than the
entire unemployment spell (Storey and Neisner 1997).
The UI Modernization Act offers an incentive for states to take a step in this direction. It
made $7 billion available to be split among state UI programs if they adopt certain measures to
increase UI eligibility. To receive the first third of their share, states must adopt an Alternative
Base Period (ABP), which allows workers to count earnings from their most recently completed
quarter in determining eligibility. This should benefit low-wage workers (Coven and Stone
2009).
States can receive the final two-thirds of their UI modernization incentive payments if
they make two of four additional reforms. One of the four options is to relax nonmonetary
requirements to make eligible those who quit for “compelling family reasons,” which include
domestic violence, illness or disability of an immediate family member, or a spouse’s
employment relocation. As of November 2010, a total of 18 states had adopted at least two of
these four provisions (USDOL 2010). Measures such as these could go a long way toward
improving UI receipt among low-educated single working mothers when they experience a spell
of unemployment.
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Table 1 UI Program Participation and Eligibility of Low-Educated Single Women, Ages 22–55
Proportions (standard errors)
Mothers
Year

(1)

Childless
women
(2)

Difference
1–2
(3)

UI participation, single women entering unemployment
Prereform period (1990–1994)

0.287
(0.017)

0.314
(0.018)

–0.027
(0.025)

Reform period (1996–1999)

0.171**
(0.017)

0.209**
(0.020)

–0.038
(0.026)

Postreform period (2001–2005)

0.214**
(0.018)

0.255**
(0.020)

–0.041
(0.027)

Prereform period (1990–1994)

0.715
(0.021)

0.842
(0.015)

–0.127
(0.026)

Reform period (1996–1999)

0.730
(0.023)

0.855
(0.021)

–0.125
(0.031)

Postreform period (2001–2005)

0.769**
(0.019)

0.826
(0.020)

–0.057**
(0.028)

Prereform period (1990–1994)

0.400
(0.025)

0.455
(0.024)

–0.055
(0.035)

Reform period (1996–1999)

0.341**
(0.025)

0.346**
(0.030)

–0.005
(0.039)

Postreform period (2001–2005)

0.387
(0.023)

0.361**
(0.027)

+0.026**
(0.035)

Monetary eligibility for UI, single women entering unemployment

Nonmonetary eligibility for UI, single women entering unemployment

NOTE: ** Statistically significantly different from same-column estimate for 1990–1994 by 0.05 level or above.
Standard errors clustered by state.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the 1990–2004 SIPP panels.
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